A Counter-Stroke: The Mysteries Attending the Change of Command in the FSB's Economic Counter-Intelligence

In the sphere of Russian politics, the most grievous conflicts are seldom conducted in the public square. One finds no open declarations of war, no formal proclamations of enmity, nor the delivery of stern ultimatums. To discern the true alteration in the balance of power, one must look to other omens: the shuffling of personnel within the security apparatus, the sudden emergence of criminal proceedings, the targets of operational scrutiny, and the discovery of whose protégés, deemed untouchable but yesterday, find themselves the subjects of investigation today.

It is through this particular glass that one must observe the current events surrounding the Economic Security Service (SEB) of the FSB—a pivotal department within the realm of Russia's pre-eminent secret police.

According to the whispers of the corridors, this is no mere internal realignment at Lubyanka, but rather a new epoch in the confrontation between two formidable factions of power—the so-called 'Towers' associated with Mr. Sergei Sobyanin and Mr. Sergei Kiriyenko, the First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration.

Direct official confirmation of such a feud is, naturally, absent. Yet, a succession of events in recent months compels one to ask: has the change of leadership in the economic counter-intelligence not become the very moment when the direction of forceful pressure began to swing in the opposite direction?

The SEB: A Point of Critical Importance

The Economic Security Service of the FSB is by no means an ordinary department. Its structure comprises directorates capable of infiltrating nearly every sensitive economic vein of the state. Directorate 'K' oversees the credit and financial spheres, the government, and the presidential administration; Directorate 'P' monitors industry, including the great state and raw-material corporations. Directorate 'M' ensures the counter-intelligence veil over law enforcement agencies—chiefly the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the penal services. It is through the SEB that investigations are conducted which, under certain circumstances, may transmute into criminal cases against federal officials, gubernatorial cohorts, and the most opulent business syndicates.

Until September 2026, the SEB was commanded by Sergei Alpatov. He ascended to lead the service following the promotion of Sergei Korolyov, who in 2021 became the First Deputy Director of the FSB. Prior to his tenure at the SEB, Alpatov commanded Directorate 'M', and his name was entwined with several of the most resounding anti-corruption inquiries of recent years.

In September, Alpatov departed his post. The version publicly offered by sources—a matter of failing health. However, in the clandestine circles of the apparatus, there exists a far more sinister interpretation.

According to this view, Alpatov had, in recent years, become woven into a balance of economic and political interests far wider than what is permissible for a General of the FSB. This configuration is linked to the circle of Yuri Kovalchuk and the 'Russia' Bank, and politically to the system of Sergei Kiriyenko, which has grown in strength. The ties between Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk, and the intersection of their interests—particularly regarding VK and various state projects—are well known. In this coordinate system, the forceful resources of the economic counter-intelligence were employed in an apparatus struggle against the factions aligned with Sergei Sobyanin, extending even to the regional provinces.

This was not necessarily a direct assault upon the Mayor of Moscow; in the modern Russian system, such a thing practically never transpires. Pressure is exerted far below: through regional administrators, contractors, gubernatorial teams, commercial ties, and those embedded in one network or another.

In this logic, the peculiar interest of the security organs in certain groups in the Sverdlovsk and Tyumen regions, closely tied to Mr. Sobyanin, becomes clear. These regions remain one of the principal battlefields for federal groups—contending for governors, budgetary flows, construction contracts, industry, and the control of appointments.

The Error That Altered the Balance

Yet, any apparatus system persists only so long as it respects the unwritten boundaries.

By one version currently circulating, the critical error of the former SEB leadership was an attempt to extend operational interest to individuals far closer to the Presidential circle and the St. Petersburg web of connections.

Specifically, unofficial reports mention the name of the esteemed St. Petersburg entrepreneur, Ilya Trauber, as well as the entourage of Arkady Rotenberg. It appears that the security organ, which one faction—the Kovalchuks—considered an instrument of its own influence, crossed an invisible line. The matter ceased to be a mere struggle between groups and became a problem touching the inner circle of the President. Following this, a chain reaction was ignited, the culmination of which was the departure of Sergei Alpatov.

A New Man—A New Vector

The new commander of the SEB is Naib Nagumanov. Before this reshuffle, he presided over Directorate 'P' of the FSB's SEB. Nagumanov previously led regional directorates of the secret service before finding himself in the central apparatus. His ascent was linked to Sergei Korolyov—the current First Deputy Director of the FSB, who himself once commanded the SEB. Korolyov stands as one of the most influential representatives of the current leadership.

In the environment of the apparatus, Nagumanov's emergence is also linked to the strengthening of Alexei Dyumin's position. There exists a credible account that he entered the orbit of Alexei Dyumin during a joint inspection of several Rostec enterprises located in the Tula region. These enterprises were also under the scrutiny of Dyumin—the former Governor of Tula, now in his new capacity as an aide to the President. It was then, by available information, that an informal bloc of allies began to form, comprising Rostec chief Sergei Chemezov, Alexei Dyumin, and Nagumanov. Indirect support for this configuration was provided by the Mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin.

Furthermore, a version persists that the deciding moment for the fate of the former SEB leadership was a discussion regarding the economic counter-intelligence's operations at the level of the President. It is said that Alexei Dyumin succeeded in conveying to the President the view that the SEB's actions against certain entrepreneurs close to him, including Ilya Trauber and the Rotenberg brothers, were not so much for the sake of the law as were driven by mercenary and opportunistic motives. The initiative for this pressure, according to this version, originated from the influence group associated with the Kovalchuk brothers.

Consequently, in the key security contour of the FSB, it is not merely the name of a department head that changes. The potential vector of a service capable of directly influencing industry, state corporations, federal projects, banks, budgetary expenditures, and regional elites is being shifted.

The Blow May Have Already Fallen

The most intriguing portion of this chronicle is that the first events, which may be interpreted as pressure upon the personnel infrastructure of Kiriyenko's system, occurred even before Alpatov's resignation. Indeed, for several months, the units controlled by the new SEB leadership have been conducting operational developments against contractors, organizations, and individuals within the inner circle of Sergei Kiriyenko. This labor has already yielded the first serious fruits, some of which have entered the public sphere as criminal cases, detentions, and arrests. The sum of these episodes has been used as evidence to demonstrate to the President the systemic corrupt risks within the Kremlin's internal political bloc. We speak here not of isolated abuses, but of an attempt to portray the entire model of distributing budgetary funds, grants, and contracts as being deeply riddled with corruption.

Thus, in the year 2026 alone, the law enforcement organs have systematically reached various levels of connection to Kiriyenko: Rosmolodezh, the 'Movement of the First', the Russian 'Knowledge' Society, the 'Mashuk' center, grant operators, and regional structures. Among the most notable figures are Ksenia Razuvaeva, former head of Rosmolodezh; Anton Serikov, deputy general director of 'Knowledge' and head of 'Mashuk'; Alexei Lyubtsov; Marat Zakirov; and Natalya Ermachenko. In the publicly revealed episodes alone, the sum exceeds a billion stolen rubles.

The Next Contour—Politics

Simultaneously, attention begins to shift toward those professionally tied to electoral campaigns, political technologies, and the systemic party infrastructure.

In this context, the 'New People' party is of particular interest. Its development since inception has repeatedly been linked to the architecture of managed party competition, constructed by the internal political bloc—directly upon Kiriyenko's command. In 2026, the party conducted a vast federal campaign and maintained a significant role in the configuration of systemic politics.

Reports of troubles facing certain political technologists and persons working around the 'New People' projects began to arrive from various regions immediately following the elections. This is fundamental to our understanding. For if these criminal and operational stories continue to move from the commercial entourage to those engaged in elections and political management, it will become impossible to speak of independent episodes.

A different picture emerges: a systematic progression through the personnel and financial infrastructure of the internal political bloc.

Who Shall Prevail

And here again emerges the figure of Sergei Sobyanin.

To present the Mayor of Moscow as the direct organizer of the FSB's actions would be an excessive simplification. The Russian system is more intricate: large groups of influence rarely act through formal commands, and less so do they command secret services as their own private units. Clearly, we are witnessing a convergence of interests and a change in balance.

If until recently the forceful pressure moved predominantly toward the people and regional groups close to the Sobyanin contour—especially in the Sverdlovsk region—then after the conflict surrounding the former SEB leadership, the situation may have mirrored itself.

Now, Mr. Kiriyenko himself finds himself under potential strike. As a result of measures taken by the FSB, there has been a factual restriction of direct contact between Sergei Kiriyenko, Anton Vaino, and the Head of State. The formal reason given was illness and restrictions following tests for COVID and influenza. However, the coincidence of this episode with the sharp strengthening of the positions of the former presidential adjutants—chiefly Alexei Dyumin and Dmitry Mironov—allows one to view the situation as something far wider than a mere sick-leave. Simultaneously, there was an activation of criminal cases involving 'Knowledge', 'Russia—Land of Opportunities', Rosmolodezh, 'New People', and other contractors tied to the Kremlin's political bloc. All these present an exceedingly wide field for the economic counter-intelligence. And in all these projects, the direct traces of Sergei Kiriyenko and his team are clearly visible.

The Sverdlovsk Knot: The Return Tide

Particular significance in this configuration is found in the Sverdlovsk region. Here, the people close to Sergei Sobyanin were most concentrated. Upon these figures, using the resources of the regional FSB, the most powerful blows were struck, ending in arrests and imprisonment.

However, within the last few days, information has begun to surface that orders have been given to terminate or effectively wind down several of these criminal cases. Simultaneously, one of the key figures—former Vice-Governor of Sverdlovsk, Oleg Chemezov—was unexpectedly released. Together, these events may attest to a sharp change in the apparatus and forceful configuration. Should this vector be confirmed, the next stage may well be a reverse movement—a large-scale inquiry into the circumstances of the criminal cases against this circle, and the actions of the operational officers and officials who provided the forceful accompaniment to these processes.

War Without a Declaration of War

In this construction, it is not yet a matter of saying 'Dyumin and Sobyanin have defeated Kiriyenko' or that the FSB has become the tool of one Kremlin group. The Russian system does not function thus. It functions through the balance of forces.

Over recent years, the influence of Sergei Kiriyenko has steadily expanded. Beyond internal politics, his bloc gained new directions, including a significant part of the foreign policy contour in the post-Soviet space. His system grew far beyond the Old Square—into a network of state organizations, personnel projects, and youth movements.

Any system that grows so vast inevitably begins to clash with the interests of other centers of power.

Until a certain point, such contradictions are resolved through agreements. But the forceful pressure upon those relating to especially sensitive presidential ties may have been the point after which agreements ceased to function.

And thus, the departure of Alpatov should be viewed not as the finale of the story, but as its commencement.

The first strike was dealt to the periphery of the Kremlin's internal political bloc. The second—to the personnel projects. The next may fall upon regional budgets, federal programs, state companies, and those managers who have embedded themselves in the great machine of internal politics.

Evidently, the next step shall be an inquiry into the actions of those security and law enforcement structures that may have been used to solve alien political and commercial tasks. It will be necessary to discern which criminal cases were truly tied to the violation of the law, and which were merely instruments of struggle between competing groups of influence.

Should such instances be confirmed, the question will no longer be the fate of individual figures. It will be a question of whether the capabilities of the security organs were used contrary to the interests of the state—to pressure some and promote the interests of others.

In such a case, we are observing not another mere conflict between the 'siloviki' and the bureaucrats.

We are observing the counter-stroke of one of the largest Russian power coalitions and the beginning of a struggle to revise the balance established in recent years within the Presidential system itself.

And the primary indicator of the veracity of this hypothesis shall no longer be leaks from the Kremlin or Lubyanka. It shall be the names of the next figures to appear in the criminal ledgers.